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1 Introduction
We investigate the link between strategies surviving under the replicator dynamics
and strategies used in correlated equilibrium. Specifically, we present a family of
4× 4 symmetric games for which, under the replicator dynamics and from a large
set of initial conditions, all strategies used in correlated equilibrium are eliminated
(hence only strategies that are NOT used in equilibrium remain). In a follow-
up article (Viossat, 2005), we show that this occurs for an open set of games
and for vast classes of dynamics, in particular, for the best-response dynamics
(Gilboa & Matsui, 1991) and for every monotonic (Samuelson & Zhang, 1992)
or weakly sign preserving (Ritzberger & Weibull, 1995) dynamics which depends
continuously on the payoffs and in which pure strategies initially absent remain
absent.
This is related to two major themes of evolutionary game theory. The first one
is the relevance of traditional solution concepts from an evolutionary perspective.
A number of positive results have been reached (see, e.g., Weibull, 1995). For
instance, in several classes of games, e.g., potential games, dominance solvable
games or games with an interior ESS, all interior solutions of the replicator dy-
namics converge to a Nash equilibrium. However, it is well known that in other
classes of games the replicator dynamics need not converge. We show more: all
strategies used in correlated equilibrium may be eliminated. This reinforces the
view that evolutionary dynamics may lead to behavior drastically distinct from
(Nash or even correlated) equilibrium behavior.
The second theme to which this note is connected is the identification of
classes of strategies that survive (resp. are eliminated) under most evolutionary
dynamics. Hofbauer & Weibull (1996), generalizing a result of Samuelson &
Zhang (1992), showed that under any convex monotonic dynamics and along all
interior solutions, all iteratively strictly dominated strategies are eliminated. A
dual statement in that all surviving strategies are rationalizable. Our results show
that, in contrast, it may be that no strategy used in correlated equilibrium survives.
The remaining of this note is organized as follow. First, we introduce the nota-
tions and basic definitions, and recall some known results on Rock-Scissors-Paper
(RSP) games. In addition, we prove that these games have a unique correlated
equilibrium distribution. We then introduce a family of 4 × 4 symmetric games
build by adding a strategy to a RSP game. We describe in details the orbits of the
replicator dynamics in these games and show that, from an open set of initial con-
ditions, all strategies used in correlated equilibrium are eliminated. We conclude
by discussing a variety of related results.
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2 Notations and basic definitions
We consider finite, two-player symmetric games played within a single popula-
tion. Such a game is given by a set I = {1, ..., N} of pure strategies and a payoff
matrix U = (uij)1≤i,j≤N . Here uij is the payoff of a player playing strategy i
against a player playing strategy j. We use bold characters for vectors and matri-
ces and normal characters for numbers.
The proportion of the population playing strategy i at time t is denoted xi(t).
Thus, the vector x(t) = (x1(t), ..., xN(t))T denotes the mean strategy at time t. It
belongs to the N − 1 dimensional simplex over I
SN :=
{
x ∈ RI : xi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I and
∑
i∈I
xi = 1
}
(henceforth, “the simplex”) whose vertices e1, e2, ..., eN correspond to the pure
strategies of the game. We study the evolution of the mean strategy x under the
single-population replicator dynamics (Taylor & Jonker, 1978):
x˙i(t) = xi(t) [(Ux(t))i − x(t) · Ux(t)] (1)
Remark: for lightness sake, we usually write xi and x instead of xi(t) and x(t).
We now define correlated equilibrium distributions. Consider a (non necessar-
ily symmetric) bimatrix game with strategy set I (resp. J) for player 1 (resp. 2).
Let gk(i, j) denote the payoff of player k when player 1 plays i and player 2 plays
j. A correlated equilibrium distribution (Aumann, 1974) is a probability distribu-
tion µ on the set I × J of pure strategy profiles (i.e. µ(i, j) ≥ 0 for all (i, j) in
I × J and∑(i,j)∈I×J µ(i, j) = 1) which satisfies the following inequalities:∑
j∈J
µ(i, j) [g1(i, j)− g1(i′, j)] ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, ∀i′ ∈ I (2)
and ∑
i∈I
µ(i, j) [g2(i, j)− g2(i, j′)] ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ J, ∀j′ ∈ J (3)
Abusively, we may write “correlated equilibrium” for “correlated equilibrium dis-
tribution”. Though the above definition applies to general bimatrix games, from
now on, we only consider symmetric bimatrix games.
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Definition: the pure strategy i is used in correlated equilibrium if there exists a
correlated equilibrium distribution µ and a pure strategy j such that µ(i, j) > 0.1
Definition: the pure strategy i is eliminated (for some initial condition x(0)) if
xi(t) goes to zero as t→ +∞.
3 A reminder on Rock-Scissors-Paper games
A RSP (Rock-Scissors-Paper) game is a 3×3 symmetric game in which the second
strategy (Rock) beats the first (Scissors), the third (Paper) beats the second, and
the first beats the third. Up to normalization (i.e. putting zeros on the diagonal)
the payoff matrix is of the form:
1 2 3
1
2
3
 0 −a2 b3b1 0 −a3
−a1 b2 0
 with ai > 0, bi > 0 for all i = 1, 2, 3. (4)
Any RSP game has a unique Nash equilibrium (Zeeman, 1980; see also Gaunersdo¨rfer
and Hofbauer, 1995, or Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998):
p = 1
Σ
(a2a3 + a3b2 + b2b3, a1a3 + a1b3 + b3b1, a1a2 + a2b1 + b1b2) (5)
with Σ > 0 such that p ∈ S4. Actually,
Notation: for x ∈ SN , x ⊗ x denotes the probability distribution on SN induced
by x.
Proposition 1 Any RSP game has a unique correlated equilibrium distribution:
p⊗ p.
Proof. Let µ be a correlated equilibrium of (4). For i = 1 and, respectively, i′ = 2
and i′ = 3, the incentive constraint (2) reads:
µ(1, 1)(−b1) + µ(1, 2)(−a2) + µ(1, 3)(a3 + b3) ≥ 0 (6)
1Note that if µ is a correlated equilibrium distribution of a two-player symmetric game, then
so is µT (defined by µT (i, j) = µ(j, i)) and (µ+µT )/2. Thus, if a strategy is used in a correlated
equilibrium distribution, it is also used in a symmetric correlated equilibrium distribution.
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µ(1, 1)a1 + µ(1, 2)(−a2 − b2) + µ(1, 3)b3 ≥ 0 (7)
Add (6) multiplied by a1 to (7) multiplied by b1. This gives
−µ(1, 2)(a1a2 + a2b1 + b1b2) + µ(1, 3)(a1a3 + a1b3 + b3b1) ≥ 0
That is, recalling (5):
p2µ(1, 3) ≥ p3µ(1, 2)
Every choice of a player and a strategy i yields a similar inequality. So we get six
inequalities which together read:
p2µ(1, 3) ≥ p3µ(1, 2) ≥ p1µ(3, 2) ≥ p2µ(3, 1) ≥ p3µ(2, 1) ≥ p1µ(2, 3) ≥ p2µ(1, 3)
Therefore all the above inequalities hold as equalities. Letting λ be such that the
common value of the above expressions is λp1p2p3, we have: µ(i, j) = λpipj for
every j 6= i. Together with (6) and (7), this implies that we also have µ(1, 1) =
λp21 (and by symmetry µ(i, i) = λp2i for all i). Therefore λ = 1 and µ = p⊗p.
The behaviour of the replicator dynamics in RSP games has been totally an-
alyzed by Zeeman (1980). In particular, letting ∂S3 := {x ∈ S3 : x1x2x3 = 0}
denote the boundary of the simplex:
Proposition 2 (Zeeman (1980)) If a1a2a3 > b1b2b3, then for every initial condi-
tion x(0) 6= p, the solution x(t) converges to ∂S3 as t→ +∞
In the case of cyclic symmetry (i.e. a1 = a2 = a3 and b1 = b2 = b3) then
the unique Nash equilibrium is p = (1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
). Furthermore, up to division of all
payoffs by the common value of the ai, the payoff matrix may be taken of the
form:  0 −1 ²² 0 −1
−1 ² 0
 with ² > 0 (8)
The condition a1a2a3 > b1b2b3 then reduces to ² < 1 and in this case proposition
2 may be proved as follow: for ² < 1, the Nash equilibrium p is globally inferior
in the sense that:
∀x ∈ S3, x 6= p ⇒ p · Ux < x · Ux (9)
More precisely,
p · Ux− x · Ux = −(p− x) · U(p− x) = −
(
1− ²
2
) ∑
1≤i≤3
(pi − xi)2 (10)
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Now, let Vˆ (x) := (x1x2x3)1/3. Note that the function Vˆ takes its minimal value 0
on ∂S3 and its maximal value 1/3 at p. Letting vˆ(t) := Vˆ (x(t)) we get:
˙ˆv(t) = (p · Ux− x · Ux) vˆ(t) = −vˆ(t)
(
1− ²
2
) ∑
1≤i≤3
(pi − xi)2 (11)
The above expression is negative whenever vˆ(t) 6= 0 and x 6= p. It follows that
for every initial condition x(0) 6= p, vˆ(t) decreases to zero hence x(t) converges
to the boundary.
4 A family of 4× 4 games
Fix ² in ]0, 1[, α ≥ 0, and consider the following 4× 4 symmetric game which is
build by adding a strategy to a RSP game:
1 2 3 4
1
2
3
4

0 −1 ² −α
² 0 −1 −α
−1 ² 0 −α
−1+²
3
+ α −1+²
3
+ α −1+²
3
+ α 0
 (12)
For 0 < α < (1 − ²)/3, the interesting case, this game is very similar to the
example used by Dekel and Schotchmer (1992) to show that a discrete version of
the replicator dynamics need not eliminate all strictly dominated strategies.2 We
now describe the main features of the above game.
Let n123 =
(
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
, 0
)
denote the rest-point of the replicator dynamics corre-
sponding to the Nash equilibrium of the underlying RSP game. Let Uα denote the
payoff matrix (12).
The case α = 0. The strategies n123 and e4 always earn the same payoff:
n123 · U0x = e4 · U0x ∀x ∈ S4 (13)
Furthermore, against e4, as against n123, all strategies earn the same payoff:
(x− x′) · U0e4 = (x− x′) · U0n123 = 0 ∀x ∈ S4, ∀x′ ∈ S4 (14)
2More precisely, the game obtained from (12) by multiplying all payoffs by −1 belongs to
the family of games a` la Dekel & Scotchmer considered by Hofbauer and Weibull (1996). In
particular, figure 1 of (Hofbauer & Weibull, 1996, p570) describes the dynamics on the boundary
of the simplex in game (12), up to reversal of all the arrows and permutation of strategies 2 and 3.)
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The set of symmetric Nash equilibria is the segment E0 = [n123, e4]. This shall be
clear from the proof of proposition 3 below. A key property is that whenever the
mean strategy x does not belong to the segment of equilibria E0, every strategy in
E0 earns less than the mean payoff. Formally,
∀x /∈ E0,∀p ∈ E0, p · Ux < x · Ux
More precisely, for x 6= e4, define xˆi as the share of the population that plays i
relative to the share of the population that plays 1, 2 or 3. Formally,
xˆi = xi/(x1 + x2 + x3) (15)
Lemma 4.1 For every p in E0 and every x 6= e4,
p · U0x− x · U0x = −(1− ²)
2
(1− x4)2
∑
1≤i≤3
(xˆi − 1/3)2 (16)
Proof. Let K = p ·U0x− x ·U0x = (p− x) ·U0x. By (13), p ·U0x = n123 ·U0x
so that K = (n123 − x) · U0x. Now let y = (xˆ1, xˆ2, xˆ3, 0). Using (14) we get:
K = (n123 − x) · U0 [(1− x4)y + x4e4] = (1− x4)(n123 − x) · U0y
Noting that n123− x = (1− x4)(n123− y)+ x4(n123− e4) and using (13), we get:
K = (1 − x4)2(n123 − y) · U0y. Now apply (10). This gives (16) and concludes
the proof.
The case α > 0. The mixed strategy n123 is no longer an equilibrium. Actually:
Proposition 3 If α > 0, then the game with payoffs (12) has a unique correlated
equilibrium distribution: e4 ⊗ e4.
Proof. Assume, by contradiction, that there exists a correlated equilibrium µ
different from e4 ⊗ e4. Since e4 is a strict Nash equilibrium, there must exists
1 ≤ i, j ≤ 3 such that µ(i, j) > 0. Define the correlated distribution of the
underlying RSP game Gˆ by:
µˆ(i, j) =
µ(i, j)
K
1 ≤ i, j ≤ 3
with K =
∑
1≤i,j≤3 µ(i, j). For 1 ≤ i, i′ ≤ 3, we have ui4 = ui′4(= −α), so that:
3∑
j=1
µˆ(i, j) [uij − ui′j] =
3∑
j=1
µ(i, j)
K
[uij − ui′j] = 1
K
4∑
j=1
µ(i, j) [uij − ui′j] ≥ 0
6
(The latter inequality holds because µ is a correlated equilibrium)
Together with symmetric inequalities, this implies that µˆ is a correlated equi-
librium of Gˆ. By proposition 1, this implies that for every 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 3, we have
µˆ(i, j) = 1/9 hence µ(i, j) = K/9. It follows that for any 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 3,∑
1≤j≤4
µ(i, j) [uij − u4j] ≤
∑
1≤j≤3
µ(i, j) [uij − u4j] = −Kα
3
< 0
This contradicts the fact that µ is a correlated equilibrium.
Nevertheless, for α < (1 − ²)/3, the above game has a best-response cycle:
e1 → e2 → e3 → e1. We will show that for α > 0 small enough, the correspond-
ing set
Γ := {x ∈ S4, x4 = 0 and x1x2x3 = 0} (17)
attracts all nearby orbits. We first show that the (replicator) dynamics in the inte-
rior of S4 may be decomposed in two parts: an increase or decrease in x4, and an
outward spiralling movement around the segment E0 = [n123, e4].
5 Decomposition of the dynamics
First, note that for every x in E0, we have: (Ux)1 = (Ux)2 = (Ux)3. This implies
that the segment E0 is globally invariant. Second, recall the definition (15) of
xˆi. For x 6= e4, let xˆ = (xˆ1, xˆ2, xˆ3). Let Uˆ denote the payoff matrix (8) of the
underlying RSP game.
Lemma 5.1 Let x(.) be a solution of the replicator dynamics (1) with x(0) 6= e4.
For every i in {1, 2, 3},
˙ˆxi = (1− x4) xˆi[(Uˆxˆ)i − xˆ · Uˆxˆ] (18)
Proof. Let i in {1, 2, 3}. If xi = 0, then (18) holds trivially. Otherwise, for every
j in {1, 2, 3} such that xj is positive,
˙ˆxi
xˆi
−
˙ˆxj
xˆj
=
d
dt
ln
(
xˆi
xˆj
)
=
d
dt
ln
(
xi
xj
)
= (Ux)i−(Ux)j = (1−x4)[(Uˆxˆ)i−(Uˆxˆ)j]
Multiplying the above equality by xˆj and summing over all j such that xj > 0
yield (18).
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The lemma means that, up to a change of velocity, xˆ follows the replica-
tor dynamics for the game with payoff matrix Uˆ (and thus spirals towards the
boundary).3 Now, recall equation (11) and the definition of Vˆ . For x 6= e4, let
V (x) := Vˆ (xˆ). That is,
V (x) = (xˆ1xˆ2xˆ3)
1/3 =
(x1x2x3)
1/3
x1 + x2 + x3
Corollary 5.2 Let x(.) be a solution of (1) with x(0) 6= e4. The function v(t) :=
V (x(t)) satisfies:
v˙(t) = −v(t)f(x(t)) with f(x) = (1− x4)
(
1− ²
2
) ∑
1≤i≤3
(xˆi − 1/3)2 (19)
Proof. We have: v(t) = V (x(t)) = Vˆ (xˆ(t)). Therefore v˙ = ~gradVˆ · ˙ˆx, with
~gradVˆ = (∂Vˆ /∂xˆi)1≤i≤3. Applying lemma 5.1 and equation (11) yield (19).
Note that v(t) is nonnegative and that the function f is negative everywhere
but on the interval [n123, e4[, where V attains its maximal value 1/3. Therefore, it
follows from (19) that V decreases along all interior trajectories, except the ones
starting (hence remaining) in the interval ]n123, e4[. We now exploit this fact to
build a Lyapunov function4 for the set Γ defined in (17).
6 Main result
Let W (x) = max (x4, 3V (x)) for x 6= e4 and W (e4) = 1. Note that W takes its
maximal value 1 on the segment E0 = [n123, e4] and its minimal value 0 on Γ.
Now, for δ ≥ 0, let Kδ denote the compact set:
Kδ := {x ∈ ∆(S),W (x) ≤ δ}
so that K0 = Γ and K1 = S4.
3The fact that when the N − 1 first strategies earn the same payoff against the N th (and
last) strategy, the dynamics may be decomposed as in lemma 5.1 was known to Josef Hofbauer
(personal communication). This results from a combination of theorem 7.5.1 and of exercise 7.5.2
in (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998). I rediscovered it independently.
4For an introduction to Lyapunov functions, see, e.g., Bhatia & Szego¨, 1970.
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Proposition 4 Let 0 < δ < 1. There exists γ > 0 such that for every game (12)
with 0 < α < γ and for every initial condition x(0) in Kδ,
W (x(t)) ≤ W (x(0)) exp(−γt) ∀t ≥ 0
In particular, the set Γ attracts all solutions starting in Kδ.
Proof. Fix ² in ]0, 1[ and recall that Uα denotes the payoff matrix (12) with param-
eters ², α. Since δ < 1, the set Kδ is disjoint from the segment E0. Therefore, it
follows from (16) that for every x in Kδ, the quantity (U0x)4− x ·U0x is negative.
Similarly, it follows from the definition of the function f in (19) that for every x
in Kδ, f(x) is negative. Therefore, by compactness of Kδ, there exists a positive
constant γ such that
min
x∈Kδ
((U0x)4 − x · U0x, f(x)) ≤ −3γ < 0 (20)
We now fix α in ]0, γ[ and consider the replicator dynamics in the game with
payoff matrix Uα. For every x in S4 and every i in S, |[(Uα − U0)x]i| ≤ α.
Therefore, it follows from (20) that
∀x ∈ Kδ, (Uαx)4 − x · Uαx ≤ −3γ + 2α ≤ −γ
Since (Uαx)4 − x · Uαx is the growth rate of strategy 4, this implies that
x(t) ∈ Kδ ⇒ x˙4(t) ≤ −γx4(t) (21)
Now, recall the definition of v(t) in corollary 5.2. It follows from (19) and (20)
that
x(t) ∈ Kδ ⇒ v˙(t) ≤ −3γv(t) ≤ −γv(t) (22)
Let w(t) := W (x(t)) = max(x4(t), v(t)). Equations (21) and (22) imply that if
x(t) is in Kδ (i.e. w(t) ≤ δ) then w decreases weakly. This implies that Kδ is
forward invariant. Therefore, for every initial condition x(0) in Kδ, equations (21)
and (22) apply for all t ≥ 0. It follows that for all t ≥ 0, x4(t) ≤ x4(0) exp(−γt)
and v(t) ≤ v(0) exp(−γt). The result follows.
It follows from proposition 3 and proposition 4 that if α > 0 is small enough,
then in the game (12) the unique strategy used in correlated equilibrium is strategy
4, but x4(t)→ 0 from an open set of initial conditions.
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7 Discussion
1. The results of this note also show that the two-population replicator dy-
namics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium along interior
solutions. See the remark in (Hofbauer & Weibull, 1995, p. 571).
2. The basic idea is that if an attractor is disjoint from the set of equilibria,
then it is likely that we may add a strategy in a way that strongly affects the set
of equilibria but does not perturb much the dynamics in the neighborhood of the
attractor.
3. As mentioned in the introduction, elimination of all strategies used in cor-
related equilibrium actually occurs on an open set of games and for vast classes
of dynamics (Viossat, 2005). This robustness is crucial for the practical relevancy
of our results. Indeed, in practical situations, we are unlikely to have an exact
knowledge of the payoffs or of the dynamics followed by the agents.
4. Proposition 4 shows much more than nonconvergence to correlated equi-
librium: all strategies used in correlated equilibrium are wiped out. In particular,
no kind of time-average of the replicator dynamics can converge to the set of
correlated equilibria. In contrast, Hofbauer (2004) shows that, in all n-player fi-
nite games and along all interior solutions, the time-average of the (n-population)
replicator dynamics converges to the Hannan set.
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